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Abstract 
An incomplete contract is a contract that fails to state all the parties’ rights and obligations, has gaps, missing provisions, and 
ambiguities in its terms and conditions. In theory, a complete contracts cannot be achieved, and many contracts inevitably 
remained incomplete. This phenomenon also applies to Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts. Human factors play an 
important role in determining the completeness of a contract. In the context of PFI contracts, this paper presents a critical review 
of incomplete contract, its causes, implications, and strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
Most economic activities involve contracts to be made. Contracts serve as an important platform to ensure that 
future planning of transactions and all potential contingencies, responsibilities, and risks are properly specified. Past 
studies in relation to contracts suggested that contracts can either be complete or incomplete. It must be noted that a 
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contract can also be categorized according to the settings of contract formation, the substance of the contract and the 
likes.  However, in this paper, the classification of a contract by Walker (2012) and Athias & Saussier (2010) is 
adopted because this paper concerns the substance of the contract i.e. whether it is incomplete or otherwise. 
A complete contract is defined as a contract that specify the rights and obligations of each party for every future 
state of the world (Scott & Triantis, 2005). In other words, a complete contract will never need alteration, renegotiate 
or additional agreement, and there is no room for adverse selection or moral hazard (Saussier, 2000).  
Whereas, a contract is said to be incomplete when it fails to spell out ex-ante the parties’ requirements, duties and 
obligations for every realized contingency (Fraja, 2002) and it has gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities in its 
terms (Hart, 1995). Past studies discussed the reason of incomplete contract include long-duration project, high risk 
or uncertainty, high transaction cost, bounded rationality, asymmetric information and signalling a trust. Although it 
seems that an incomplete contract is unavoidable, what needs to be noted is the implication that it brought to the 
success of a project. Literature review reveals that an incomplete contract could give positive and negative 
implication to the success of the project. While the positive implication is obviously good for the project, attention 
should be given to minimizing or eliminate the negative implication of incomplete contracts.  
In theory, complete contracts cannot be achieved and many contracts, including contracts for Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), remained inefficiently incomplete. PFI is an alternative procurement strategy that had been 
introduced to undertake the development of public infrastructure and services, which previously it were the public 
sector’s responsibility (Khairuddin, 2009). According to United Kingdom model, PFI forms a subset under Public-
Private Partnership umbrella (Khairuddin, 2009). In PFI, the public sector will specify the required output and 
purchase the services provided by the private sector. On the other hand, the private sector will be responsible to 
finance, design, construct, manage, operate and maintain the project until the end of the concession period. 
This paper aims to present a review of incomplete contract focusing on its causes, implications, and strategies, 
with reference to PFI contracts. The review is conducted through an extensive literature review. The paper proceeds 
as follows. First, a review regarding the concept of contract is presented. Second, followed by discussions on the 
incomplete contract in PFI contracts and standard contracts. Third, the cause of incomplete contract is explained. 
Fourth, followed by the implication of incomplete contract. Finally, strategies to deal with the incomplete contract 
are presented. The final part of the paper is the concluding remark. 
2. The concept of contract 
In general, a contract can be categorized into a complete and an incomplete contract. A complete contract is 
designed under the assumption of zero transaction costs (Solum, 2012) and symmetric information (Athias & 
Saussier, 2010). The terms of the contract should cover for every contingency, which means that it is free from gaps. 
Past studies argued that there is no possibility of adverse selection, moral hazard or even disputes in a complete 
contract because any potential source of dispute has already been identified (Athias & Saussier, 2010; Hart, 1995). 
However, a complete contract is difficult to achieve because parties always face with uncertainties which 
consequently requires parties to renegotiate, breach or litigate (Iossa, Spagnolo, & Vellez, 2007; Hart, 1995). Since 
the world itself is complex, it somehow affects the contracting parties to achieve bargains or complete contracts 
(Kostritsky, 2004). Craswell (1999) contended that a complete contract is only an imaginary concept use by people 
to define one endpoint of completeness. 
The incomplete contract is the opposite of complete contract. Kostritsky (2004) stated that most contracts are 
incomplete to some degree. Due to the incompleteness of contract, the contracting parties are exposed to the risk of 
having disputes, moral hazard or adverse selection (Iossa et al., 2007). Findings from Nur Syaimasyaza & 
Khairuddin (2014) found four characteristics of incomplete contract, and they are presented in Table 1.  
         Table 1.Characteristic of incomplete contract  
No. Characteristic Description 
1 The contract has gaps 
or loophole 
(Gurcaylilar-
Yenidogan, 
The following circumstances explain the gap or loophole in the contract: 
i. The contract has missing provision or complete absence of certain 
specification; 
ii. The contract did not specify who has the right to decide or the decision 
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Yenidogan, & 
Windspergerc, 2011; 
Hart, 1995) 
 
actions for a certain contingency; or it only specifies who has the right to 
decide but does not specify the decisions actions to be taken;  
iii. The parties are aware of certain contingencies, but they are unable to specify 
it in the contract because the state of nature cannot be verified; 
iv. Certain contingencies were deliberately left out of contract with the intention 
to renegotiate later 
Due to the above circumstances, the parties fail to provide for a term and leave a 
literal gap or a loophole. 
2 The contract has 
vague or ambiguous 
clauses (Hart, 1995) 
The clause or term used in the contract is not clear and creates room for different 
interpretation among the parties.  
3 There are additional 
work and changes 
(Badenfelt, 2011) 
Certain operation is not included in the original contract or during the course of the 
contract. The parties, usually the client or public entity wish to add or change 
certain work. Additional work and changes cause the parties to amend the contract. 
4 The contract is 
renegotiated (Tirole, 
2009) 
i. Contracts are renegotiated when contractual provision happen to be 
inadequate to deal with certain contingencies. 
ii. An incomplete contract is a contract specifying the available design, which is 
renegotiated whenever this design turns out not to be appropriate. 
iii. Renegotiate in terms of scope of work or compensation. 
iv. Renegotiate because of changes that are required after contract execution. 
Sources: Nur Syaimasyaza & Khairuddin (2014) 
Hart & Moore (1988) stated that almost every contractual dispute that has been brought to courts concerns a 
matter of incompleteness. Although there is no specific indication that the cases concern incomplete contract, on a 
closer review the disputes that occurred show the characteristic of incomplete contract. In the context of 
construction contracts examples of incomplete contract include in UK case of Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v 
McKinney Foundations Ltd [1970], the contract has gap where it lack of provision specifying contractor’s 
entitlement to extension of time when there is delay caused by the client. The court ruled that the contractor was 
entitled to an extension of time which is due to delay caused by the client and the court considered that the missing 
provision as a fatal shortcoming. Another example of incomplete contract can be found in Weeshoff Constr. Co. v. 
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. [1979]. In this case, the ambiguity of the term ‘temporary resurfacing’ had 
led to the dispute. Both parties differ in their interpretation of the term ‘temporary resurfacing’ and ‘Extra Work’ 
and the contract did not give a clear definition regarding the matters. 
The literature review presented above, therefore, confirms that a contract can either be complete and incomplete. 
From the discussion above,              Table 2 below presents the comparative analysis of complete and incomplete 
contract. 
             Table 2.Comparative analysis of complete and incomplete contract 
 Complete Incomplete 
Definition  A contract that specifies the rights and 
obligations in every future state of the 
world for each party 
1. A contract which has gaps, missing 
provisions, and ambiguities in its terms; 
2. A contract that fails to clearly spell out 
ex-ante the parties’ requirements, duties 
and obligations for every realised 
contingency 
Characteristics The contract is free from gap 1. The contract has gaps or loopholes 
2. Vague or ambiguous clause 
3. Additional work and changes 
4. The contract is renegotiated 
Transaction cost The contract is designed under the 
assumption of zero transaction cost 
The contract is designed under the 
consideration of transaction cost 
Types of 
information 
Symmetry information  Asymmetry information 
Implication  No possibility of moral hazard, adverse There is possibility of moral hazard, adverse 
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selection or dispute selection, and dispute 
 
This paper is reviewing the concept of incomplete contract in PFI projects. Consequently, the remaining part of 
this paper will then be focusing on this subject matter.  
 
2,1 Concept of Incomplete contracts in PFI  
 
Although disputes do occur in PFI projects, there are hardly any PFI cases brought to court (Robb, 2012). It 
seems that the parties prefer to resolve the matters through commercial negotiation or alternative dispute resolution 
instead of going to court for fear that it will damage their relationship (Robb, 2012). One example of PFI case is in 
Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v. Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184. In this joint venture agreement, the 
parties dispute on the interpretation of the word “Completion”. Lesdor claimed that Cordon had not fully completed 
the construction work and refused to sign the strata plan, which prevent Cordon to start selling the properties. There 
was no definition of “Completion” in the contract. Therefore, the court ruled that the term “Completion” refers to 
“full completion” of construction work and not “partial completion” or “practical completion”. 
The contract for the first PFI project for a museum in the United Kingdom (UK), the Royal Armouries, at Leeds, 
England had also showed evidence of incomplete contract. In this project, they Museum suffered financial collapse 
due to the big difference between the realized visitor rates against estimated projection (Froud, 2003). The fact that 
the parties failed to foresee the realized visitor rates before signing the contract means that the contract has gaps in 
the sense that the parties are aware of certain contingencies, but they are unable to specify it in the contract because 
the state of nature cannot be verified. As stated by Cruz & Marques (2013) “accurately estimating demand for long 
periods is virtually impossible. Estimating human behaviour or economic conditions is a difficult task in the short 
run, but becomes “finger up” estimation for the long run”. 
Almarri & Blackwell (2014) contended, even if the public and private parties have detailed their duties in the 
contract, but the fact that this detailed scope changes with time, renegotiation is bound to happen in order to adapt to 
the new conditions. This shows the phenomenon of incomplete contract. Apart from that, NAO (2008) reported that 
within PFI projects in the UK enormous amounts of money were involved in addressing contract changes. Contract 
changes are needed when the contract is incomplete. In 2006 alone, an estimated £180 million was paid by public 
authorities to PFI contractors to undertake changes (NAO, 2008). Further changes are inevitable in PFI projects so 
as to meet inevitable changes in public services (NAO, 2008).  
In Malaysia, the evidence of incomplete contract could be seen in the annual Auditor-General’s Report 2012, for 
example, in Kolej Tentera Darat (KTD) in Port Dickson (due to a large amount of additional works done outside the 
scope of the contract). Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim (2011) in their research found that the failure factor of housing 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Malaysia is due to the absence of robust and clear agreement. They further 
reported that some developers have taken advantage to exploit loopholes in their PPP contracts. 
 
2.2 Standard contract 
 
The use of a standard contract is very common in the construction industry. Through many years of drafting 
construction contracts, common similar provisions or terms had been identified and led to the formation of standard 
contracts. Many institutions either internationally or locally had established their standard contract for construction. 
For example, international institutions refer to The Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) and International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), and locally in Malaysia, refer to Pertubuhan Arkitek Malaysia (PAM) and Jabatan 
Kerja Raya Malaysia (JKR). However, since the implementation of PFI is quite new, not many countries can design 
standard contract.           Table 3 presents some of the countries with their standard PPP/PFI contract. Malaysia also 
has their standard template for PFI contract drafted by Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia, but it is not made 
public.  
          Table 3.Lists of standardized PPP/PFI contracts and contract clauses  
Jurisdiction Standard 
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United 
Kingdom 
Standardized contracts for PFI projects, includes extensive guidance on each element of the 
contract 
Australia Standard commercial principles for social and economic infrastructure PPPs, set out why and how 
key risks and responsibilities should be allocated in the contract 
India Model agreements for PPP in a range of transport sectors 
Netherlands Standard PPP contract for DBFM in buildings and DBFMO in infrastructure 
New Zealand Draft standard PPP contract 
Pakistan Standardized PPP Provisions 
Philippines Sample contracts for PPP in bulk water supply, ICT, solid waste management, and urban mass 
transit 
South Africa Standardized PPP provisions published alongside the South Africa PPP Manual 
Sources: PPIAF (2012) 
However, a standard contract can also become incomplete. The logic is, as time goes by, a new kind of 
uncertainty or risk might surface, and the provisions or terms that had been stated in the contract could become 
obsolete. Furthermore, due to unique features of the construction project, the usage of a standard form of contract 
might not be suitable for every construction project. Similarly, a standard PFI contract cannot guarantee that the 
contract terms and conditions therein are complete. Even if the parties try to make the contract as complete as 
possible, future events and variables facing the project, over the next 20-30 years of the contract, such as political, 
economic, environmental and social changes are bound to happen (Cruz & Marques, 2013) and might cause the 
contract to become an incomplete contract. 
3. Causes of Incomplete Contract 
There are various factors that cause the contract to be incomplete for example, due to long-duration of project 
(Kostritsky, 2004), high risk or uncertainty (Ya-zhuo & Fan, 2011) and high transaction cost (Guasch, 2004). 
However, this paper will only focus on the factor that relates to a human being as a player in the contract (Fig.1).  
 
 
Fig.1.Causes of incomplete contract that relates to human beings 
Human being plays a significant role in the completeness of the contract. The human being is usually bounded by 
their rationality. The rationality of the individual is said to be bounded by the information they have, the limitation 
of their mind (knowledge) and the time they have to acquire the information. Furthermore, the world itself is 
complex and uncertain. Every individual will not only faced difficulty in foreseeing future contingency, and they 
may also be confronted with radical uncertainty, hindering them to compose complete contracts (Brousseau & 
Glachant, 2004). Even if the parties have the knowledge about the future, but they may lack the skill, the language 
or the incentive to identify ex-ante these states in their contract (Anderlini & Felli, 2004). Bounded rationality is not 
INCOMPLETE 
CONTRACT 
Bounded 
rationality 
Assymmetric 
information 
Signalling 
trust 
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limited to the contracting parties itself. Let say the disputes is brought to court, the judge can also be bound by his 
rationality where there is probability that the judges may take a long time to decide their judgment, refuse to rule, or 
make mistakes, etc. (Brousseau & Glachant, 2004). In short, as long as human being is involved in designing, 
implementing and enforcing the contract (including contracting parties and third party, such as court), they are 
bound with their rationality and the contract remain incomplete.  
Many past studies had discussed on the cause of incomplete contract in PFI contract in light of bounded 
rationality. Among them are Ho & Tsui (2009) and Guasch (2004). PFI contract is typically a long-term contract 
with many uncertainties and risks. Therefore, PFI players as a human being are certainly bounded by their 
rationality. In addition, given that PFI projects are long-term contract with high level of uncertainty and complexity, 
as expected PFI players had limited ability to acquire the information, and the contract is inevitably incomplete.  
Another factor that causes the contract to be incomplete, which relate to human is asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information refers to a situation where the parties to the transaction did not possess the same amount of 
information (Vaněk & Botlík, 2013). Every person has countless ways of using physical resources, including their 
bodies to acquire information. Therefore, every individual’s knowledge is dissimilar compared to each other in 
terms of its quantity and subject of the knowledge. The problem of asymmetric information arises when the parties 
with more or better information act opportunistically. The contract remains incomplete when private information 
exists (Athias & Saussier, 2010). As an illustration, let say there are changes in the specifications of a contract 
between the contractor and government. Usually, the contractor is more experienced and knowledgeable in 
construction work compared to the government. Having more knowledge in that area, the contractor might try to 
take the opportunity to raise prices and profits in the event that there are changes in specification. Many past studies 
agreed that the problem of asymmetric information cause PFI contract to be incomplete. Among them are Parker & 
Hartley (2003) and Ho & Tsui (2009). Asymmetric information in PFI will expose the party to opportunism (Parker 
& Hartley, 2003). Ho & Tsui (2009) suggested that in the event that information asymmetry is severe, the public 
sector should consider using a conventional approach instead of PFI.  
The contracting parties may purposely choose to design incomplete contract to signal that they trust the other 
party. In other words, the contracting parties did not design complete contract for fear that it will give the impression 
that they do not trust the other party and consequently can affect the party’s motivation to commit to the contract 
(Herold, 2010). Using a complete contract that fully specifies the fines, punishments, and explicit incentives will 
indicate the party distrust and consequently, lower the other party’s motivation and ruin the relationship (Herold, 
2010). If both parties trust each other, it is expected that the contract will be incomplete as they believe that they can 
renegotiate the contract to fill in any problems that appear later on.  
4. Implication of Incomplete Contract 
Past studies have contradicting opinion on the implication of incomplete contract. Overall, the implication of 
incomplete contract can be divided into positive and negative implications. In this study, positive implication is 
categorized as any implications arising from an incomplete contract that could positively affect the project’s success 
or help smoothen the progress of the project. While the negative implication is categorized as any implications that 
might disrupt the progress of the project or compromise the success of the project. 
 
4.1 Positive Implications 
 
It is important to realize that incomplete contract is not necessarily bad contract. In some circumstances, an 
incomplete contract is preferable than a complete rigid contract. Ya-zhuo & Fan (2011) explained that the 
transaction cost of incomplete contract is lower compared to complete contract.  The rationale is that, by leaving out 
certain contingencies that are deemed to be insignificant, the parties can minimize the cost of transaction and by the 
same token, the drafting process of the contract could be accelerated.  
For a contract that has many uncertainties throughout the extended contract duration, such as PFI contract, a less 
complete contract is said to be more effective because it provides the necessary flexibility to deal with the 
complexity and uncertainty of the environment (Cruz & Marques, 2013). Furthermore, throughout the contract 
duration, the parties might face many changes for example policy, technology, market demand and others. Even if 
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they had specified all contingencies in the contract, but due to the uncertainties of the future, the provision that had 
been stated in the contract could become obsolete or need to be renegotiated. Guasch (2004) contended that 
renegotiation could become the mechanism to enhance project welfare and enhance project efficiency. 
In addition, more contractual incompleteness increases the contracting parties’ managerial flexibility and allow 
innovation in their delivery (Cruz & Marques, 2013), signals more trust and increase the contracting parties’ 
motivation (Herold, 2010), and consequently increase the economic value of the project. 
 
4.2 Negative implications 
 
In spite of the positive implications mentioned before, what needs to be noted is the negative implications of 
incomplete contract. Although it is inevitable to use incomplete contract, the contracting parties must be aware that 
there are many negative implications of incomplete contract that could affect the project’s success. The work of 
many authors, including Ya-zhuo & Fan (2011) and Guasch (2004) have highlighted that incomplete contract could 
expose the contracting parties to the risk of opportunistic behaviour, i.e. moral hazard, adverse selection, refusing to 
cooperate, maladjustment, initiates renegotiation. When the contract is incomplete, typically the parties need to 
renegotiate the contract. However, some party might use renegotiation as a means to achieve their benefits 
(opportunistic behaviour) (Iossa et al., 2007).  Not to mention, the execution of renegotiation itself will require 
additional resources, i.e. extra cost, manpower, time. Moreover, renegotiation could cause haggling, and 
consequently inefficient decisions are being made (Guasch, 2004; Hart, 1995). 
Many authors, including Robinson & Scott (2009) and Hart (1995) asserted that incomplete contract could cause 
conflict and dispute. To be specific, the circumstances that cause conflict and dispute are when there are ambiguities 
in the contract, variations, and additional works. The ambiguous clause could lead to conflict and dispute when the 
parties have a different interpretation of the clause and consensus regarding the meaning of the clause could not be 
achieved. On the other hand, variation and additional works can cause time and cost overruns (Peter, Love, Davis, & 
Cheung, 2010). As the variation and additional works are among the characteristics of incomplete contract, 
therefore, we can imply that incomplete contract cause time and cost overruns. 
When the contract is incomplete, there is a risk of opportunistic behaviour. Boukendour (2007) stated 
‘opportunism is among the main sources of contractual failures.' Opportunism can occur in many forms, for 
example, bidding distortion or the phenomenon of “lowballing” during tender bidding. In a PFI project, for example, 
bidders submit bids that seem attractive, but in reality it is hard to materialize, to increase their chances of winning 
the bids with the expectations that the contract will be renegotiated (Athias & Saussier, 2010; Iossa et al., 2007). 
Opportunism could also occur in the form of underinvestment or overinvestment. The possibility of underinvestment 
is present when the parties’ obligations are not fully specified in the contract, which will give opportunities to the 
parties to renegotiate the contract. While, contractual incompleteness could cause overinvestment in circumstances 
where the parties invest too heavily on some future contingencies that could be better off not trading (Baker & 
Krawiec, 2006). 
5. Strategy to deal with Incomplete Contract 
Although incomplete contract is inevitable, people still need to contract to carry out their business transaction. 
While the positive implication of incomplete contract could be favorable, what needs to be a concern is the negative 
implication. Strategy or solution is needed to minimize or alleviate the negative implication of incomplete contract. 
Abdallah, Darayseh, & Waples (2013) proposed three solutions to reduce the negative implication of incomplete 
contract in a construction contract that are as follows: 
x (Cost, quality, time/past performance, and information available about the project) are important in determining 
the ethical relationship between owners and contractors in the construction process and to the success of 
construction contracts. 
x The importance of trust, ethics and cooperation in solving the problem of opportunism costs or agency costs, and 
hence in achieving efficiency in contracting. 
x Equal access to information reduces, if not eliminates, the agency problem 
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On the other hand, Robinson & Scott (2009) and Luo (2002) proposed a similar solution to deal with the 
incomplete contract. They believe that by promoting good working relationship or what they call ‘spirit of 
partnership’ with a mutually agreed goals and objectives, could reduce the negative implication of incomplete 
contract. Rationally, the parties with a mutual goals and objectives are expected to work together towards that goal 
and the problem with opportunistic behaviour could be alleviated. A good working relationship could also assist the 
negotiation process, reduce the uncertainty during bargaining session and prevent disputes (Robinson & Scott, 
2009). The problem with asymmetric information could be alleviated if both parties work together with a common 
goal. Good working relationships will naturally increase trust. This will lead to a better and timely information 
exchange and thus, reduce the degree of asymmetric information and the risk of opportunism (Gurcaylilar-
Yenidogan et al., 2011; Ya-zhuo & Fan, 2011). 
Ya-zhuo & Fan (2011) added that the principal and the agent need to depend more on trust and reputation to 
avoid the problem of defining completely such long-term contracts. The problems of adaptation to changes that 
usually occur in a long-term contract, such as in PFI contract can be easily overcome by sustaining good cooperation 
among contracting parties (Luo, 2002). Not only that, the transaction costs associated with uncertainty and 
negotiation of the contract could be reduced if the contracting parties have a common objective and trust. However, 
according to Froud (2003), trust is usually built up through a repetitive transaction. While, public sector usually 
contracted PFI with different partners, to avoid monopoly. Therefore, referring to Froud (2003), it is difficult to 
build up trust for the purpose of dealing with an incomplete contract in PFI contract. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper presents a literature review of incomplete contract, its causes, implications and strategies with 
reference to PFI. In terms of contract, literature review confirms that a contract can either be complete or 
incomplete. A contract is deemed to be complete when it is free from gap. On the contrary, incomplete contract has 
gaps, ambiguous clause, additional works and the contract are renegotiated. From the literature review, it is 
understood that most contracts are incomplete to some degree due to long-duration contract, high risk or uncertainty, 
and high transaction cost. Therefore, PFI contract is inevitably incomplete as PFI project normally long-duration 
project with high risk and usually involve high transaction cost. However, PFI players also have an important role in 
determining the completeness of the contract. Bounded rationality, asymmetric information, and signaling trust are 
among the factors that cause the contract to be incomplete, which is closely related to the human being.   
Especially for PFI contract, where the contract duration could extend as long as 30 years, PFI players have 
limited ability to foresee, write or prove future contingency. In addition, the complex structure of PFI contract which 
involves many parties with different interest can be an addition cause to asymmetric information. Incomplete 
contract does not always brings negative implication. In some circumstances, for example, in PFI projects, it is 
preferable due to its flexibility to cope with uncertainty, increase contracting parties’ managerial flexibility, signals 
more trust and increase the contracting parties’ motivation. But it could also cause conflict and disputes, risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, time and cost overruns and others.  
The presence of incomplete contract in general and specifically in this paper has provided literature evident, 
which suggest that its presence is also happening in PFI contract. Strategy is needed to deal with an incomplete 
contract, especially for a long-duration contract like PFI. Among the strategies proposed by past studies is the 
importance of trust, ethic, and cooperation, information sharing, promote the spirit of partnership and others.  
There are some limitations in this study. The implementation of PFI among the countries may vary due to varying 
levels of risks, constraints and different in culture. Therefore, the implications of PFI incomplete contract and the 
strategies to deal with it may also vary among the countries. However, this paper only presents the findings as in 
general and not specific to countries. Hence, future research may want to investigate the implication of PFI 
incomplete contract and strategies for a particular country for a more comprehensive findings.  
Despite its limitations, the present study offers some input to the government and the private sector, especially 
those in PFI project about the existence of incomplete contract, its implication and strategies to deal with it. This 
study is on-going whereby the next step is to identify the area or provision in PFI contract that is deemed incomplete 
and its implications, extents and the appropriate strategies to deal with the incompleteness. 
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